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ABSTRACT 
 
Transfer pricing has emerged as common practice among highly diversified companies. Company 
goes for either domestic transfer pricing or international transfer pricing for several distinctive 
reasons. While domestic transfer pricing aims for enhancing divisional autonomy and divisions’ 
managers, international transfer pricing expects for less taxes, tariff, duties and excises. Therefore, 
international transfer pricing has significant taxation implication. With expansion of transfer 
pricing, financial statement users demand unconsolidated account to thoroughly evaluate specific 
segments’ performance, track transfer pricing practices and the taxation implication on the 
companies. Due to these increasing demands, segmental reporting is impartially needed. The 
present paper highlights the (1) theoretical aspect of transfer pricing and its taxation implication 
and (2) the disclosure of transfer pricing and its taxation implication in Malaysian segmental 
reporting environment. A study of 80 companies listed on Malaysian Board has been conducted to 
evaluate the transfer pricing and its taxation implication disclosure in Malaysian’s segmental 
reporting environment. As exploratory attempt, the study found that companies voluntarily disclose 
the basis of setting up transfer price. However, such disclosure is not adequate to assist 
performance evaluating and decision-making process as transfer price is only been reported in 
business segment, taxation implication has been disclosed as consolidated figure and moreover 
transfer pricing and its taxation implication is voluntary disclosure. Intensive effort should be 
carried out to improve those disclosures in future particularly by imposing mandated reporting for 
transfer pricing and its taxation implications. Further study shall be conducted to expand the 
sample, intensify segment report preparers’ behavioral study and cross analysis between countries.  
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
egmental reporting involves breaking the company down into its constituent parts or segments and 
reporting financial information on a disaggregated basis for each segment (Gray and Roberts, 1989). 
Radebaugh and Gray (2002) further define segmental reporting as the counterpoint information that 
involves the disaggregating of consolidated financial statements. Meanwhile, Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
(MASB) defines segmental information as information about an enterprise’s different types of products and services 
and its operation in different geographical areas.  
 
 A company may segment its operation in various ways, with the two most common methods are 
segmentation by industry or type of business or often called line of business (LOB) and by geographical area. The 
amount of segment information provided by companies varies in terms of the items disclosed and the number of 
segments reported. These are influenced by the company’s management discretion in defining its business activities, 
external reporting mechanism, different geographical area of operating and reporting standard set up by a the 
respective accounting bodies. 
 
S 
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 Multinational and multi-diversified companies around the world are facing increasing pressure to disclose 
more segmental information in their financial report (Garrod, 2000). These pressures come from various parties such 
as International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), Organization of Economic Cooperation Development 
(OECD) and Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) as well as from other users of companies’ financial 
statement. 
 
 In recent years, companies throughout the world have diversified their activities. This diversification includes 
the process of venturing business in different locations or geographical areas. The study by Reed and Luffman (1986) 
found that the purposes of diversification range widely from risk reduction, discretional change, stabilization of 
earnings and increasing growth. It also helps companies to have more source of revenue instead of depending onto a 
particular business segment. This raised a question whether consolidated financial statements and aggregated 
accounting figures are adequate for companies’ operations consisting of a number of activities in a variety of locations  
with different profitability potential, risks, rate of return and growth opportunities. Another reason that contributes to 
the complexities of the business operation nowadays is the merger and acquisition activity of a wide variety of 
business operations. Due to this problem, users of financial statements face difficulties in evaluating and assessing the 
companies, and predicting the future activities only from traditional financial statement such as income statement, 
balance sheet statement and owners’ equity statement. In view of the complexity involved, segmental information 
disclosure is significantly needed. 
 
 Furthermore, pressures to disclose more segmental information is due to the fact that many users are affected 
directly by only one part of a company (Gray et al., 1989). For instance, employees’ compensation is generally more 
directly dependent upon a performance of the specific part of the group with which they work than upon the 
performance of the group as a whole. Besides, host governments are interested in the performance of individual 
segment of the group that is located in their countries. Customers, suppliers and creditors are keen on a specific part of 
the companies’ business activities. Therefore, they demand disaggregated information. In addition, stakeholders of 
multi-diversified companies need financial information to evaluate the past performance of companies and their future 
prospects. These can usually only be understood if the users know the importance of each class of business a 
geographical area in which the companies operate. 
 
Segmental information, which might be imperfect, goes some way towards fulfilling these needs since 
different industries and countries have different profit potentials, growth opportunities and degrees of risk, different 
rates of investment returns and different capital needs (Gray et al., 1989). Besides, it is argued that consolidated 
accounts provide information that is too aggregated for users to assess the various risks and rewards associated with 
the individual components of the whole organization (Ronen and Livnat, 1988). Information on these risk and return 
differences is vital if the published accounts are to be represented faithfully (Solomons, 1989), a quality desired by 
most accounting bodies (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1976). 
 
There are however, exist special problems in evaluating the performance of reporting segments when goods 
or services are transferred from one division to another in order to manufacture finished products or from unit to 
another unit in different geographical area. A transfer price is the price charged when one segment of a company 
provides goods or services to another segment of the company. Transfer pricing has two different forms, that are 
domestic transfer pricing and international transfer pricing. For multi-diversified companies such as a multinational 
corporation (MNC), the objective of transfer pricing change as compared to domestic transfer pricing. International 
transfer pricing involves goods and services being transferred cross international borders. Thus, international transfer 
pricing focuses on minimizing taxes, duties, and foreign exchange risks, along with enhancing a company’s 
competitive position and improving its relations with foreign government. The summary of transfer pricing objectives 
are graphically presented in Figure 1 
 
 From the foregoing discussion, it raised one important question that to be addressed in this paper. Do transfer 
pricing and its tax implication is adequately disclosed by segmental reporting? The discussion will focus on the 
disclosure of such information in the context of Malaysian segmental reporting practice. However, further explanation 
will also incorporate international perspective. This paper is organized into six parts. Part One discusses the 
background and the importance of segmental reporting. Part Two describes the theoretical aspect of transfer pricing. 
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Part Three explains transfer pricing and tax implications. Part Four presents the analysis of disclosure of transfer 
pricing and taxation implication in Malaysian’s segmental reporting environment. Part Five further discusses the 
issues and finally, Part Six provides overall conclusion on the issue. 
 
 
Figure 1: 
Objective of Domestic and International Transfer Pricing 
 
 
Source: Garrison and Noreen, 2000 
 
 
II.  THEORY OF TRANSFER PRICING 
 
 An important outcome of the growth of multinational companies is that much of the world’s trade takes place 
within companies located in various countries. The prices at which the transactions take place are transfer prices. 
Transfer price has important implications for taxation, management control, and the relationships between such 
companies and their host countries. When the units are separate companies within a group, the transfer pricing is 
necessary for financial reporting and the calculation of taxable income. When the companies or units are in different 
tax jurisdictions, the issue becomes more important because of different accounting rules and tax rates.  
 
 Previous studies have been conducted in the area of transfer pricing. Arpan (1971) found use of market prices 
outside the United States. Tang (1979) found the popular use of a cost plus basis in the United States and Japan. 
Plasschaert (1985) meanwhile suggests that manipulation of transfer prices is more common in developing countries 
as governments are poorly equipped to monitor multinational companies.  Jacob (1996) and Harris (1993) suggest that 
US-based multinational companies move income around the world in response to changes in tax rates. Researchers, 
tax authorities and managers are intensely interested in how transfer prices are set, since they can have a dramatic 
effect on the profitability of a division or unit within a group as well as tax collection. Three common approaches 
employed to set transfer prices are; (1) negotiated prices, (2) cost basis and (3) market price. In a survey of transfer 
pricing practice in large companies in Canada, Atkinson (1987) found that 85% of the responding companies reported 
that they used transfer pricing. From the survey also proved that 57% of the responding companies adopted cost basis, 
30% chose market price basis, 7% employed negotiated price basis and the remaining 6% chose other approaches. 
 
Negotiated price 
 
 A negotiated transfer price is a transfer price that is agreed on between the selling and purchasing units. This 
approach preserves the autonomy of the units and is consistent with the aspiration of decentralization style of 
management. Secondly, the managers of the unit are likely to have much better information about the potential costs 
and benefits of the transfer than others in the company. As a negotiated price is employed, the concern managers are 
Domestic Transfer Pricing 
- enhance divisional autonomy 
- increase motivation of managers 
- enhance performance evaluation 
- improve goal congruence 
Objective of transfer pricing 
International Transfer Pricing 
- reduce taxes, duties and tariffs 
- reduce foreign exchange risks 
- enhance competitive position 
- improve governmental relations 
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going to meet and discuss the appropriate terms and conditions of the transfer. They may decide not to go through 
with the transfer, but if they do, they must agree to a transfer price. The exact transfer price under such approach is 
very difficult to predict. However, the selling unit will agree to the transfer if the profits of the selling division 
increase as a result of the transfer and the purchasing unit agrees to the transfer if the profits of the purchasing unit 
also increase as a result of the transfer. Thus, the actual transfer price agreed by the two unit managers fall anywhere 
between these two assumptions or also known as the range of acceptable transfer price – the range of transfer price 
within which the profits of both units participating in a transfer price would increase (Garrison and Noreen, 2000). 
This assumption is graphically presented in Figure 2A and Figure 2B respectively. 
 
 
Figure 2A: 
Selling Unit’s Minimum Acceptable Transfer Price 
 
Transfer price   Variable cost per unit + Total Contribution margin on lost sales 
              Number of units transferred 
 
 
Figure 2B: 
Purchasing Unit’s Maximum Acceptable Transfer Price 
 
Transfer price   Cost of buying from outside supplier 
 
Source: Garrison and Noreen, 2000 
 
 
However, negotiate transfer price consists of the following limitations; (1) time consuming for the managers 
involved as it takes longer time and thorough terms and conditions discussion before finalizing the exact price, (2) 
leads to conflict between units within a group, (3) makes the measurement of unit profitability sensitive to the 
negotiating skills of managers, (4) requires the time of top management to oversee the negotiating process and to 
mediate disputes and (5) leads to a suboptimal level of output if the negotiated price is above the opportunity cost of 
supplying the transferred goods.  
 
Cost basis 
 
 Companies may also set transfer prices at either the variable cost or full cost basis incurred by the selling 
units. However, setting transfer price at cost basis has various disadvantages. First, the use of cost particularly full cost 
basis as a transfer price can lead to bad decisions and sub-optimization. Full cost or absorption cost approach provides 
a varying transfer price since the cost per unit is constantly changing as capacity use varies. Besides, mixing the short 
run and long run components of costs, it obscures the underlying cost structure from decision makers in the 
organization and therefore fails to suggest how cost savings can be obtained by using capacity more efficiently. In 
addition, the full cost approach is often implemented by using a formula approach that takes a variable cost and adds 
an arbitrary markup to cover capacity-related costs and perhaps a targeted profit margin (Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998). 
Secondly, if cost is used as the transfer price, the selling unit will never show a profit on any internal transaction. The 
only unit that shows a profit is the division that makes the final sale to external parties. Thirdly, cost-based transfer 
price does not provide incentives to control costs. If the costs of one unit are simply passed on the next, then there is 
little incentive for anyone to work to reduce costs. Despite, the disadvantages, cost-based transfer price are commonly 
employed in practice. 
 
Market price 
  
Transfer pricing based on competitive market price is considered as the best approach to transfer pricing 
problem. The conditions of a highly competitive market imply that the producing division can sell as much of the 
product as it wishes to outside customers, and the purchasing division can acquire as much as it wishes from outside 
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vendors without affecting the price. In this matter, the market provides an objective valuation of the intermediate 
product, and that price should be used as basis for price transfers and guide within the firm. 
 
 If the purchasing division cannot make a long-run profit at the outside market price, then the company is 
better off to not produce the product internally and to go to the external market for its supply. Similarly, if the 
purchasing division cannot make a long-run profit when it must acquire the product at the external price, the division 
should cease acquiring and processing this product and should allow the producing unit to sell all its output to the 
external market. With a competitive market for the intermediate product, the market price provides an excellent basis 
for allowing the decisions of the producing and purchasing divisions to be independent of each other (Solomons, 
1965). 
 
 However, conflict may incur when the price for the intermediate product or service is quoted on both a long-
term contract and a spot market basis. When the market is not perfectly competitive, as it usually is not for most 
manufactured goods, the transfer price problem becomes much more complicated. In addition, conflict also arises 
between short run and long run considerations. An external vendor may quote a low price in an attempt to buy into the 
business, with the exception of raising prices later. The company normally should not switch its source of supply from 
an internal unit to an outside company unless it is confident that the outside company has the potential to maintain the 
quoted price for a substantial period. Shortly, none of the proposed solutions to transfer pricing problem are perfect – 
including market-based transfer price. (Garrison et al., 2000). 
 
III.  TRANSFER PRICING AND TAX IMPLICATIONS 
 
 Definitely, tax authorities are alert to the problem of transfer pricing, which has become more important as 
globalization proceeds.  Therefore, governments have empowered tax authorities to make adjustments to the 
calculation of taxable income in order to correct transfer that are not at arm’s length. In United States for example, 
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, which is the basic transfer pricing rule, has led to many regulations and tax 
cases. The outcome of the adjustments may be there is double taxation of some income of multinational companies. In 
some cases, governments have taken a different approach and required apportionment of worldwide profits of such 
companies (the unitary method). However, there is no international consensus on this rather broad-brush approach 
(Nobes and Parker, 2000). So, as to add order to this area, governments have made tax treaties with each other on the 
subject of transfer prices. These are generally based on model tax treaties, such as those prepared by the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 1979) and the United Nations. 
 
 Taxes introduce another layer of complexity into transfer pricing. Consider an organization that manufactures 
products Country X, which has a marginal tax rate of 20%, and sells those products in Country Y, which has a 
marginal tax rate of 30%. Obviously, this organization would like to locate most of its profits in Country X, where the 
tax rate is lowest.  Therefore, it will want to use the highest possible transfer price for the commodity. As example, the 
particular manufacturing company may set high transfer prices for intra group goods sold from Country Y to Country 
X. Besides transfer pricing practice, the charging of royalties, interest of management fees is another mechanism for 
moving profits. For many companies, these tax considerations outweigh the behavioral considerations in setting a 
transfer price, and transfer pricing policy is driven by the objective of minimizing global taxes.  
 
 Needless to say, tax authorities understand this incentive and have taken steps to moderate companies’ 
behavior. The tax authority in each country scrutinizes the international transfer pricing policies of companies doing 
business in that country to ensure that these companies are not using arbitrary transfer prices to avoid paying local 
taxes. The most important document relating to international transfer pricing is the 1995 Organization for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development guidelines statement. This document provides the foundation that many nations use to 
develop their individual tax laws that regulate transfer pricing behavior for companies that do business in their 
respective countries. The OECD guidelines divide transfer pricing practice into two main groups (refer Table 1). 
OECD guidelines state that, whenever possible, the CUP method, which uses either the market price or an imputed 
market price, should be employed. If there is no market price, preference falls to cost-plus basis.  
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Table 1: 
OECD’s Transfer Pricing Group 
Transaction Group Other Method 
a. Comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) 
b. Cost – plus 
c. Resale price methods. 
a. Profit Splits 
b. Transactional net margin method 
c. Other approaches that are related to 
    partitioning the profits from trading 
 
 
 Studies of practice suggest that the cost-plus method of transfer pricing is the most widely employed for 
domestic transfer pricing, where as market price method is widely used for international transfer pricing. If given free 
choice, companies that use market prices to meet international transfer pricing requirements would switch to cost-plus 
methods. Alternatively, there is a group of companies that swing from using cost-based transfer price to market-based 
transfer price in the presence of a tax authority (Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998). The results of these studies may mean 
that companies use market-based transfer prices to meet the requirement of tax authorities because they are to the 
companies’ advantage. However, the companies do not really believe that the profit signals provided by these market 
prices are meaningful, so they prefer to use cost-based methods for internal decision-making. Other than this 
interesting finding, it is instructive to observe how tax authorities interpret the cost component of a cost-based transfer 
price. It appears that most tax authorities allow companies to use whatever costing systems their external auditors 
have certified as conforming to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). As GAAP was designed for 
external reporting purposes, and not for making sound economic operating decisions, it permits a huge variation in 
costing practice. Such flexibility creates an opening for opportunistic behavior by companies to select tax minimizing 
methods when computing a cost-based transfer price. 
 
 Transfer pricing also leaves implication and question on who should bear the burden of the corporate tax? 
Will it be the owners of business or customers or workers of companies? Many economists believe that workers and 
customers bear much of the burden of the corporate income tax. As an example, suppose Country X decides to raise 
the tax on the income earned by automotive companies. At first, this tax hurts the owners of the car companies, who 
receive less profit. But, over time, these owners respond to the tax. Because producing cars is less profitable, they 
invest less in building new automotive plant or invest less in technological improvement or invest in other country 
who offer lower marginal tax rate. With fewer plants mean fewer productions, the supply of cars declines, as does the 
demand for automotive workers. Thus, an increasing tax on automotive companies causes the prices of cars to rise and 
the wages of automotive workers to fall. To get worse, relocation of automotive plants to other countries cause less 
foreign direct investments in Country X and may cause social instability due to high unemployment rate. Transfer 
pricing implication on corporate income tax shows how dangerous the flypaper theory of tax incident can be. The 
corporate income tax is popular because it appears to be paid by rich corporations. Yet those who bear the ultimate 
burden of the tax – the customers and workers of companies – are often not rich. 
  
IV. TRANSFER PRICE AND TAXATION IMPLICATION DISCLOSURE 
 
 A study has been carried out to investigate transfer price and taxation disclosure in segmental reporting 
among 80 Malaysian public listed companies. These companies are listed in First Board of Malaysian Bourse under 
industrial product, consumer product and trade/service sub sector. The annual reports of 2002 of those companies are 
reviewed twice for this study. The list of under studies companies is given as in Appendix 1. The descriptive analyses 
of those companies are summarized in Table 2A and 2B. 
 
 
Table 2A: Sub Sector 
Sub - Sector Number of Companies 
Industrial Product 30 (37.5%) 
Consumer Product 21 (26.25%) 
Trade & Service 29 (36.25%) 
Total 80 (100%) 
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Table 2B: Segment Disclosure 
N = 80 
Sub - Sector Disclose both Business 
Segment and Geographic 
Segment 
Disclose Business Segment 
Only 
Disclose Geographic 
Segment Only 
Industrial Product 20 (25%) 9 (11.25%) 1 (1.25%) 
Consumer Product 12 (15%) 7 (8.75%) 2 (2.5%) 
Trade & Service 14 (17.5%) 15  (18.75) 0 (0.0%) 
Total 46 (57.5%) 31 (38.75%) 3 (3.75%) 
 
 
 Results of Table 2B reveals that 46 companies chose to disclose both business segment and geographic 
segment. 31 companies disclose only business segment and only 3 companies disclose geographic segment. Business 
segment is defined as a distinguishable component of a company that is engaged in providing an individual product or 
service or related products or services and that is subject to risks and returns that are different from those of other 
business segments (MASB, 2002). Meanwhile, geographic segment is defined as a distinguishable component of a 
company that is engaged in providing products or services within a particular economic environment and it is subject 
to risks and returns that are different from those of components operating in other economic environments (MASB, 
2002). The less number of companies disclosing geographic segment is in line with previous study by Edwards and 
Garrod (1996) and Prodhan and Harris (1986), which revealed that geographical segment disclosure is identified as 
sensitive information, particularly for companies where a large contract may be its only operation in that location and 
may be the only contract within a large geographical area. 
 
 
Table 2C: Transfer Pricing Approaches 
 
N = 80 
Sub - Sector Market  
Basis 
Cost 
 Basis 
Negotiated Basis Not  
Disclose 
Industrial Product 9 (11.25%) 2 (2.5%) 11 (13.75%) 8 (10%) 
Consumer Product 11 (13.75%) 3 (3.75%) 1(1.25%) 6 (7.5%) 
Trade & Service 22 (27.5%) 1 (1.25%) 5 (6.25%) 1 (1.25%) 
Total 42 (52.5%) 6 (7.5%) 17 (21.25%) 15 (18.75%) 
 
 
 Results of Table 2C proved that majority of companies (52.5%) adopt market price basis as transfer pricing. 
Market price reflects an objective valuation of the intermediate product and it guides decision making process within 
firm. In addition, market price provides better divisional performance evaluation compared of using other approaches 
especially negotiated price basis. Only 17 companies adopt negotiated transfer pricing style. Majority of them are 
listed as industrial product companies. The six other companies adopt cost basis transfer pricing particularly among 
consumer product companies, whereas the fifteen companies do not indicate their transfer pricing approaches.  
 
 
Table 2D: Taxation Disclosure 
 
N = 80 
Sub - Sector Taxation Disclosure in 
Segment Results Only 
Taxation Disclosure in 
Segment Results, Segment 
Assets and Segment 
Liabilities 
No Taxation Disclosure 
Industrial Product 21 (26.25%) 7 (8.75%) 2 (2.5%) 
Consumer Product 18 (22.5%) 3 (3.75%) 0 
Trade & Service 25 (31.25%) 4 (5.0%) 0 
Total 64 (80.0%) 14 (17.5%) 2 (2.5%) 
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 Result of Table 2D reveals that 64 companies (80%) disclose taxation implication in segment results. 
Segment result shows segment revenue and segment expense. The only taxation implication discloses in segment 
results is income tax expense, earnings before interest and income tax (EBIT) and earnings after income tax (EAT). 
Segment assets is defined as the operating assets that are employed by a segment in its operating activities and that 
either are directly attributable to the segment or can be allocated to the segment on a reasonable basis (MASB, 2002). 
Segment liabilities are defined as the operating liabilities that result from the operating activities of a segment and that 
either are directly attributable to the segment or can be allocated to the segment on a reasonable basis (MASB, 2002). 
Taxation implication recorded in segment assets consist of income tax assets and tax recoverable. Whereas taxation 
implication recorded in segment liabilities include of income tax liabilities, tax payable and deferred taxation 
 
V.  DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
 
 It cannot be denied that companies nowadays go for business diversification and geographical diversification. 
These activities demand more than consolidated financial statement in order to thoroughly evaluate each business 
segment and geographic segment performance. The answer to these demands is segmental information disclosure. As 
companies attempt to take advantage on the different rates of returns, risks and growth opportunities, each unit or 
division within a company’s group has been located differently. For instance oil and gas company like Exxon Mobil 
has refining division in country M, which processes crude oil into gasoline, kerosene, lubricants and other end 
product. Those products later are sold to retail sales division in country, for instance; Thailand, Singapore and 
Philippines before being distributed to Exxon Mobil’s chain of petrol station in respective countries. Each product has 
a price for transfers within the company. Clearly the refining division would like the transfer price to be as maximum 
possible, meanwhile the retail division would like the transfer price to be as low as possible. Such transfer pricing will 
be more significant and has greater taxation implication if the products move from one geographical area to another 
geographical boundary with different taxation system, tax rate and tax charges. 
 
 Therefore, question raises whether segmental reporting adequately disclose transfer pricing practice and 
record its taxation implications? Many quarters need segmental information to enhance the evaluation and decision-
making process pertaining transfer pricing activities. Definitely the host government needs segmental information to 
access its taxation system implication on the companies operation. Would the companies’ management happy with the 
current taxation impose or they are not happy thus thinking of relocating its operation in other countries who offer 
lower tax rate? Unit or division’s managers also need segmental report in order to evaluate their own performance. 
Would to low transfer price harms its revenue and would to exorbitant transfer price distort its costing? In addition, 
employees and external suppliers are also keen with transfer pricing disclosure in segmental reporting, as it directly 
involve their performance assessment and business opportunities respectively. 
 
 A study has been conducted to evaluate transfer pricing and its taxation implication disclosure in 80 
companies listed at Malaysian Bourse. Those companies are classified as industrial product sub sector, trade & service 
sub sector and consumer product sub sector. Those companies has diversified their business operation and also 
conducting businesses in different countries. An analysis found that those companies disclose the basis of transfer 
price as segmental reporting voluntary disclosure. As indicated in Table 2C, most companies choose market price as 
the basis of transfer pricing. The figure of transfer pricing is also clearly reported in segment revenue, as the 
companies derive net external revenue, which is equivalent to net revenue figure in consolidated financial statement. 
This is graphically presented in following Figure 3. However, the companies in the study only reveals transfer pricing 
or inter – segment sales in their business segment only and no such disclosure in geographic segment. 
 
 On taxation implication due to transfer pricing, such disclosure are also inadequate. The income tax 
disclosure is a consolidated figure, which equals to tax figure in group of company’s consolidated financial statement. 
As far as the study concern, only one company discloses income tax implication at each different business segment 
before arriving at consolidated taxation figure. This pattern also applies when the company discloses taxation 
implication in segment assets and segment liabilities. In addition, taxation implications are being disclosed only in 
business segment and no such disclosure in geographic segment. 
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Figure 3: 
Inter – Segment Disclosure of Malayan Cement Berhad 2002 
Group Cement & 
Clinker 
RM’000 
Other 
Building 
Materials 
RM’000 
Readymix 
Concrete 
RM’000 
Other 
Operation 
RM’000 
Elimination 
RM’000 
Consolidated 
RM’000 
Revenue       
External Sales 1,045,824   202,968   401,601     23,612     1,674,005 
Inter-segment 
sales 
   146,607       4,148       6,430     17, 735   (174,920)            - 
Total revenue 1,192,431   207,116   408,031     41,347   (174, 920)   1, 674,005 
 
 
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 From the above discussion, it has been concluded that transfer pricing is common practice in highly 
diversified companies as they attempt to grab different rate of return, risks and opportunities growth. Transfer pricing 
has two major forms that are domestic transfer pricing and international transfer pricing. While domestic transfer 
pricing aims to enhance divisional autonomy, international transfer pricing has significant implication on taxation, 
duties and excise as well as enhancing governmental relations. 
 
 In investigating the transfer pricing and its tax implication disclosure in Malaysian companies’ segmental 
reporting, the study showed that companies disclose the basis of transfer price. However, such disclosure is not 
adequate in order to assist interested parties in performance evaluating process and in decision-making process. These 
inadequacies are as follows: 
 
 The reporting transfer pricing is disclosed only in business segment.  
 The taxation implication is disclosed only at consolidated figure. 
 Transfer pricing and taxation implication disclosure is considered as voluntary disclosure and not as 
mandated disclosure by Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB). 
 
Realizing the importance of segmental information disclosure in evaluating process and decision making 
process, such disclosure should also be improved in order to facilitate the record on transfer pricing practice and its 
taxation implication. One of the best ways is imposing transfer pricing and taxation implication disclosure in 
segmental reporting as the mandated disclosure. However, such amendment shall only be done after thorough 
discussion with accounting standard setter bodies, taxation authorities and the reporting companies. Some reporting 
companies believe too much segmental disclosure especially in geographic segment may cause competitive 
disadvantage and harm their performance. The study can also be extended in future by expanding the number of 
sample in order to obtain significant generalization. Secondly, it can also be extended to analysis the behavioral aspect 
of segmental reporting preparers especially why they prefer to disclose transfer pricing and taxation implication in 
business segment and not in geographic segment. In addition, further study can also be applied in other countries in 
order to provide comprehensive cross analysis and comparison insights. In fact such studies can significantly 
contribute towards harmonization of segmental reporting disclosure with regard to international transfer pricing 
practices and its taxation implication.   
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APPENDIX 1: LIST OF COMPANIES 
 
Uchi Technology   FFM Berhad    Fraser & Neave Holdings 
Ta Ann Holdings   Yeo Hiap Seng    UMW Holdings 
Sunway Building Technology KLG Glass Industrial   MWE Holdings 
Thong Guan Industries  Jerasia Capital    Oriental Holdings 
PSC Industries   Mintye Industries    Nikko Electronics 
Linear Corporation   Sin Heng Chan    Mamee Double Decker 
Kian Joo Can Factory  I – Berhad    Malaysia Flour Mill 
Dijaya Corporation   CSM Corporation    Diethelm Holdings 
CHG Industry   Ayamas Food Corporation   Arus Murni Corporation 
TSH Resources   Yee Lee Corporation   Bousted Holdings 
Paracorp Bhd   Pernas International   Multi Purpose Holdings 
Pan Malaysia Corporation  Naluri Berhad    EOX Group 
Muda Holdings   Sime Darby    Metacorp Berhad 
Malayan Cement   Genting Berhad    Minho Berhad 
Leader Universal Holdings  Integrated Logistics Berhad   Goh Ban Huat 
Keck Seng Holdings  Kumpulan Emas    Delloyd Ventures 
Grand United Holdings  Magnum Corporation   KUB Malaysia 
Ho Wah Genting   Malayan United Industries   Lii Hoe Industries 
Ramatex Berhad   MBM Resources    KFC Holdings 
Kim Hin Industry   Mechmar Corporation   Golden Pharos 
Hexza Group   Mulpha Corporation   Time Engineering 
Resorts World   Construction and Supplies House  Sri Wani Holdings 
Paos Holdings   Telekom Malaysia    Chemical Company of Malaysia 
Sindora Berhad   Texchem Resources   Fiamma Holdings 
Wembley Industries Holdings Marco Holdings    Inti Universal Holdigns 
Press Metal Berhad   Utusan Melayu    Konsortium Logistic Berhad 
Sarawak Enterprise Corporation 
